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In a model inspired by the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, non-cooperative countries allocate 
their emissions to internationally trading and non-trading sectors. Each country is better off 
with trading than without, and aggregate welfare is maximized with all sectors in the trading 
scheme. We simulate the effects of expanding the trading scheme in a two-country model with 
quadratic abatement costs. If only the original trading sector is asymmetric between countries, 
the welfare change is always positive and the same in both countries. If only the additional 
trading sector is asymmetric, one country might lose, but there is an aggregate welfare gain. If 
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When it comes to choosing instruments for environmental policy, economists are greatly in favour of 
tradable emission permits. With this instrument, emission reduction will be undertaken by those firms who 
can do it at the lowest cost. 
Recently, emission trading has been applied more and more in environmental policy. The largest scheme 
so far is the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) for the carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions 
of around 12,000 firms in energy-intensive industries in all 27 Member States. The scheme covers about 
50% of the EU’s total CO2 emissions. The EU ETS started in 2005 and Phase 2 runs from 2008-2012, 
coinciding with the Kyoto commitment period. All EU Member States have committed to certain 
greenhouse gas emission reductions in this period under the Kyoto Protocol (1997). Currently, the 
European Commission’s proposals for Phase 3, which will run from 2013-2020, are being discussed. The 
proposals include an expansion of the scheme to other industries and greenhouse gases. 
Each Member State has to submit a National Allocation Plan (NAP) to the Commission for approval. This 
NAP details the total amount of permits the MS intends to distribute, and how it intends to allocate these 
among its firms. The Commission’s main criteria for the Phase 2 NAPs were that they should be 
consistent with the Member State’s Kyoto target and they should take into account the expected 
development of emissions and technical reduction potential. 
In this paper, we analyze what would happen if Member States could determine by themselves (without 
Commission approval) how many permits to allocate to their firms in the EU ETS. Each country will still 
have to meet its national (Kyoto) target, therefore allocating more permits to the internationally trading 
sectors means that there are less emissions left for the non-trading sectors. 
Countries will try to manipulate the international permit price with their permit allocation. A net seller of 
permits tries to drive up the permit price by reducing its allocation to its trading sectors, while a net buyer 
tries to reduce the permit price by allocating more permits to its trading sectors. 
We find that each country is better off with any international trading scheme than without. This is the 
standard economic argument of gains from trade. Moreover, the welfare of all countries together would be 
maximized with an international trading scheme covering all sectors, because then there is nothing to 
manipulate anymore. However, this does not mean that each country will benefit from an expansion of the 
trading scheme, like the one that is proposed for Phase 3 of the EU ETS. 
We look at the effects of expanding the trading scheme more closely in a two-country model. If only the 
original trading sector is asymmetric between countries, the welfare change is always positive and the 
same in both countries. If only the additional trading sector is asymmetric, one country might lose, but 




The concept of emissions trading is appealing in principle and has been shown to work in
practice. If the market works well, all polluting ￿rms set their marginal abatement cost
equal to the permit price and the e¢ cient allocation of emissions is achieved. After the
success of the Sulfur Allowance Trading scheme in the US (Ellerman et al., 2000), the EU
set up its Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) for the CO2 emissions of large industrial
sources. The EU ETS came into operation in January 2005 and now includes around half
of the EU￿ s CO2 emissions from 12,000 installations across all 27 Member States. It is
currently the largest company-based emission trading scheme in the world.
However, the fact that the EU ETS is an international scheme introduces a new
complication. While individual ￿rms may take the permit price as given, an individual
country might be large enough to manipulate the permit price with its allocation of
permits to its internationally trading ￿rms. As an example, let us take Phase 2 of the EU
ETS which corresponds with the Kyoto compliance period (2008-2012). Although each
Member State1 has a national greenhouse gas emission ceiling under the Kyoto Protocol
or the Burden Sharing Agreement, a country still has room to manoeuvre because it can
decide how to allocate this ceiling between those sectors participating in the EU ETS (the
trading sectors) and those outside the scheme (the non-trading sectors). A country that
will sell permits within the EU ETS will want to drive up the permit price. It can do
so by reducing the allocation of permits to its trading sectors, which means more will be
left for its non-trading sectors. Conversely, a permit buying country will try to decrease
the permit price by issuing more permits to its trading sectors. The strategic interaction
between countries trying to manipulate the permit price with their permit allocations,
and especially the welfare e⁄ects of this behaviour, is the subject of this paper.
It is easily seen that a country is always better of with any international emission
trading scheme than without it. This is simply the standard economic argument that trade
improves welfare. It is also intuitive that the countries￿joint welfare is maximized when all
polluting sectors are included in the international scheme. This would leave the individual
countries no room to manipulate the permit price, and all polluters would have marginal
1Except for Cyprus and Malta.
1abatement costs equal to the permit price. However, this does not imply that each
country￿ s welfare is maximized when all sectors are included in the international trading
scheme. Nor can we be sure that each country would always gain from an expansion of
the trading scheme to include more ￿rms.
We will set up the simplest possible model to analyze the complicated issue of the
welfare e⁄ects of expanding the international trading scheme. This is not only an intriguing
theoretical issue, but it is also relevant to the EU ETS. The European Commission is
planning to increase the coverage of the EU ETS from 2013, as we will discuss in more
detail in Section 2.
While our model was inspired by the EU ETS, it applies to any international emissions
trading scheme. We can expect to see more of these schemes in the future, as countries
around the world are starting to take climate change policy more seriously. The success
of the EU ETS may lead other countries to link their domestic trading scheme to it or
to set up another international trading scheme. Any scheme is likely to be partial in its
coverage. Small ￿rms and households will probably be excluded, because the transaction
costs of setting up and running the scheme for them would be prohibitive. Thus, a country
that participates in an international emission trading scheme will always face the choice of
how to allocate emissions between its internationally trading and its non-trading sectors,
and the temptation to manipulate the permit price with this choice.
The seminal study on market power in markets of transferable property rights is
provided by Hahn (1984). Assuming a single ￿rm has market power, he demonstrates
that the total expenditure on abatement will exceed the cost-minimizing solution unless
the ￿rm with market power receives an amount of permits equal to the number that it
holds in equilibrium. Thus the distribution of permits matters not only in terms of equity,
but also for e¢ ciency.
Hahn (1984) also shows that, when a regular interior minimum exists, a transfer of
permits from any of the price takers to the ￿rm with market power will result in an
increase in the equilibrium price. A direct corollary of this result is that the ￿rm with
market power itself uses more permits with an increase in its initial allocation. The
ine¢ ciency of the market increases as the number of permits allocated to the ￿rm with
2market power raises above or falls below the amount of permits it holds in equilibrium.
Hahn￿ s (1984) model was extended by Van Egteren and Weber (1996) to allow for the
non-compliance of ￿rms with their regulatory obligations. Their ￿ndings are supportive
of Hahn￿ s (1984) result that the initial distribution of permits in￿ uences the degree of
market power in the permit market. Malik (2002) shows that the ￿rm with market power
may choose to hold more permits than it needs such that it e⁄ectively retires permits
from the market. Moreover, this behaviour is not found to be a function of the possible
non-compliance of ￿rms. Armstrong (2008) considers a two-period model with market
power in which the allocation of allowances is made dependent upon historic allowance
acquisitions. It is shown that such a model can ensure either market e¢ ciency (elimination
of market power) or time e¢ ciency (optimal behaviour is achieved across time periods as
opposed to within time periods), and under speci￿c conditions both can be achieved.
Helm￿ s (2003) paper is closest to ours. Helm (2003) models the endogenous choice of
emission allowances by non-cooperative countries for a global pollutant in regimes with
and without permit trading. The major di⁄erence is that Helm (2003) assumes that each
country sets its own national emission level and that the permit trading regime covers
all sectors of the economy in all countries. In our paper, national emission ceilings are
given and the international trading scheme does not cover all sectors. Then countries
have to decide how to allocate their ￿xed national emission ceiling between trading and
non-trading sectors.
Helm (2003) shows that environmentally less concerned countries tend to choose more
allowances if these are tradable, while environmentally more concerned countries choose
fewer allowances. The overall e⁄ect on emissions is ambiguous. In addition, it is found
that as countries are a⁄ected di⁄erently by a trading scheme, there may be no unanimous
agreement on trading even if it leads to a fall in pollution. Conversely, even if aggregate
emissions are higher, a trading regime may be unanimously approved by countries due to
the e¢ ciency gains of the permit market. In our paper, by contrast, international emission
trading always increases a country￿ s welfare, because total emissions remain the same.
Maeda (2003) analyzes a permit market consisting of one large buyer, one large seller
and many price-taking parties. He ￿nds that the large seller has e⁄ective market power
3(the ability to move the permit price away from its competitive level) if and only if the
volume of his excess permits exceeds the net shortage of permits in the market. The large
buyer cannot have e⁄ective market power.
Babiker et al. (2004) demonstrate how an international emission trading scheme may
lead to a direct welfare loss in some countries due to general equilibrium e⁄ects when
there are market distortions. This occurs in countries exporting emission permits when
e¢ ciency costs associated with the pre-existing distortionary taxes are larger than the
primary gains from emission trading. Similarly, B￿hringer et al. (2008) show that there
could be substantial e¢ ciency losses to the imposition of emission taxes on sectors that
are covered by the EU ETS.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the experience so
far with the EU ETS, as well as the literature on this subject. Section 3 constructs a
theoretical model of the EU ETS which is then developed in Section 4 in order to provide
conditions which determine whether a country buys or sells permits. Section 5 discusses
the welfare implications of the trading scheme, whilst Section 6 looks at the possible
impact of expanding the trading scheme in the context of a simple example. Finally,
Section 7 concludes.
2 The EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS)
The EU Emissions Trading Scheme ETS came into operation in January 2005 and now in-
cludes around half of the EU￿ s CO2 emissions from 12,000 installations across all 27 Mem-
ber States.2 It covers energy activities (combustion, mineral oil re￿neries, coke ovens),
ferrous metals, the mineral industry (cement, glass, ceramics) and pulp and paper. All
installations in these sectors above a certain minimum size are included in the EU ETS.
Plants whose total emission level exceeds their total EU allowance (EUA) holdings either
have to reduce their emissions or buy unused allowances from other ￿rms. Otherwise ￿rms
will be ￿ned 40 Euros for every excess tonne of CO2 beyond the number of allowances
they hold.
2Convery and Redmond (2007), Ellerman and Buchner (2007) and Kruger et al. (2007) discuss the
workings of the EU ETS and its operation in Phase 1.
4Phase 1 of the EU ETS ran from 2005 through 2007. Phase 2 coincides with the Kyoto
compliance period (2008-2012). Phase 3 will run from 2013 to 2020.
For Phases 1 and 2, each Member State had to submit a National Allocation Plan
(NAP) to the Commission for approval. A country￿ s NAP speci￿es the total amount of
EUAs it will issue to the plants covered by the EU ETS, and how this total allowance
is distributed between the individual plants. It also details how the Member State plans
to deal with new entrants and how many allowances it plans to auction. The maximum
amount that can be auctioned is 5% in Phase 1 and 10% in Phase 2. The majority of
allowances is grandfathered, i.e. distributed for free.
In Phase 1, the allowance price rose to around e30 per Mton CO2 before the 2005
compliance ￿gures were announced in April and May 2006. These ￿gures revealed a large
overallocation of allowances, so that the price dropped to around e15. By the end of
Phase 1, allowances had become virtually worthless. Banking of allowances into Phase 2
was practically ruled out.
The main criteria on which the Commission assessed the Phase 2 NAPs were that
they should be consistent with the Member State￿ s emission development, its reduction
potential, and its commitment under the Kyoto Protocol or burden sharing agreement
(BSA). Under the Kyoto Protocol of 1997, the EU as a whole (15 members) took on a
greenhouse gas reduction target of 8% in 2008-2012 compared to 1990. The Member States
later distributed this reduction among themselves in the BSA. The new EU members
(except for Cyprus and Malta) have a national emission reduction target under the Kyoto
Protocol.
In their Phase 2 NAPs, the Member States proposed to allocate allowances for a
total of 2325 Mton CO2. The Commission only allowed 2083 Mton, a reduction of 10%.
It looked comparatively favourably upon the Western European Member States￿NAPs,
approving the amounts proposed by the UK and France and mandating cuts of 6% for
Italy and Germany, 7.5% for Belgium and 8.5% for Greece. It also approved the amount
proposed by Slovenia, but it was much harsher for the rest of the new Member States, with
cuts of 27% for Poland, 37% for Bulgaria and 49% on average for the Baltic states. The
new Member States typically had no problem reaching their generous Kyoto targets, but
5fell foul of the combined expected emissions/reduction potential criterion. Many Eastern
European Member States have appealed against the Commission￿ s decision. However,
while the appeal is pending (which could take a few years), the Member States have to
implement the Commission￿ s decision.
In January 2008 the European Commission announced its proposals for Phase 3 (2013-
2020) of the EU ETS (EC, 2008), as part of its overall plan to reduce EU greenhouse gas
emissions to 20% by 2020. The Commission plans to extend the coverage of the EU ETS
to additional sectors (aluminium and aviation) and greenhouse gases (nitrous oxide and
PFCs). It proposes a formula for the Member States￿allowance allocation in each year, so
that Member States would no longer have to submit NAPs to the Commission. Finally,
the Commission would like the share of auctioned allowances to rise to 100% by 2020, at
least for those sectors that are not too exposed to international competition.
A number of studies have conducted computable general equilibrium analyses of EU
trading schemes. The Commission asked Capros and Mantzos (2000) to use the PRIMES
(EC, 1995) energy system model to analyze the impact of alternative emission trading
schemes implemented in the EU-15 in 2005. The emission reduction commitments are
assumed to apply for the year 2010. In the Reference case it is assumed that each Member
State separately implements its burden sharing target at least cost. The total compliance
cost is estimated at e 9bn, with marginal abatement costs di⁄ering substantially across
Member States. The compliance cost rises to e 20.5bn Euros in the Alternative Reference
case in which it is assumed the Kyoto commitment must apply to each individual sector,
with no emission trading between sectors.
Capros and Mantzos (2000) then consider alternative EU-wide emission trading schemes
in which di⁄erent sets of sectors participate. If emission trading takes place only among
energy supply sectors in the EU, total compliance costs are 7.2bn Euros. If the trading
scheme is expanded to include energy intensive industries in the EU, total compliance
costs fall by a further 0.3bn Euros. Coverage in this scenario is quite close to the actual
EU ETS. If the emission trading takes place among all sectors in the EU, total costs fall
to 6bn Euros, a 34% reduction relative to the Reference case.
In the two partial trading scenarios, Capros and Mantzos (2000) let each Member
6State allocate the same emissions to its trading sector as it does in the Reference case.
However, this is not optimal in any sense. Indeed, as Bernard et al. (2004) already note,
the full bene￿ts of EU-wide trading among all sectors can also be realized in a partial
trading scheme by a suitable set of national allocations. All that is needed is for each
Member State to allocate to its non-trading sectors the amount they would emit under
full trading, and the rest of its allowed national emissions to its trading sectors. A less
rosy view of Member States￿behaviour would have each country choose the allocation
that minimizes its own compliance cost, given the other countries￿allocations. That is
exactly the scenario that we will examine in this paper.
Bernard et al. (2004) assume, as we will, that each Member State allocates its emis-
sions between trading and non-trading sectors so as to maximize its own welfare, given
the other countries￿allocations. Using the GEMINI-E3 model for the EU-15 in 2010-2020,
they identify three major players: Germany operates as a potential seller while Italy and
the Netherlands are assumed to collude as potential buyers. The combined power of
Italy and the Netherlands is similar to that of Germany. However, the three countries￿
deviations from the competitive allocation are quite small, as are their welfare losses.
Viguier et al. (2006) also assess the strategic allocation of emission allowances in the
EU ETS, using a two-level computable equilibrium model. Four groups of players are
considered: Germany, the UK, Italy and the rest of the EU. These regions have to choose
among four di⁄erent rules to allocate emission allowances across economic sectors. The
equilibrium solutions are found to the di⁄erent possible strategy choices and from this
the payo⁄ matrices are obtained by running the GEMINI-E3 model. It is shown that
the EU Member States characterised by high abatement costs could be tempted to give a
generous initial allocation of allowances to their energy-intensive industries. However, the
incentive to act strategically is relatively small as there would only be a limited impact
on country payo⁄s.
De Muizon (2006) uses the GTAP-ECAT model to analyze the e¢ ciency of the EU
ETS. In particular, the cost implications are investigated of allocating the trading sectors
a quantity of allowances for the 2008-2012 period such that their total emissions, as a
share of national emissions, is the same as that granted by the 2005-2007 NAPs. Each
7Member State is then assumed to respect its Kyoto commitment in 2010 by imposing
an appropriate CO2 tax on the non-trading sectors. Comparing the di⁄erence between
the market allowance price and the shadow price of emissions in the non-trading sectors
it is found that there would be ine¢ cient burden sharing between the trading and non-
trading sectors. For instance, while the equilibrium permit price is found to equal e 6.5,
the tax level ranges from zero for each of the Eastern European countries to e430 for
Denmark. In fact, an average tax of e113 per tonne of CO2 is required by the EU-15. De
Muizon (2006) investigates three possible solutions to mitigate this ine¢ cient outcome:
Allocating the optimal amount of allowances to the trading sectors, importing credits
from Joint Implementation and Clean Development Mechanism projects, and expanding
the sectoral coverage of the trading scheme.
B￿hringer and Rosendahl (2008) focus speci￿cally on the impact the strategic choice
of emission allowances by Member States may have on the outcome of the EU ETS. They
do this by running a number of simulations of the non-cooperative equilibrium based on
a partial equilibrium multi-regional model for the EU-27 countries. This model is based
on marginal abatement cost curves for trading and non-trading sectors in the EU-27 that
are calibrated to empirical data. Crucially, they ￿nd that single countries can indeed
have a signi￿cant impact by exploiting their market power. For instance, it will lead
to substantial di⁄erentiation of marginal abatement costs across countries in the sectors
outside the EU ETS, although the e⁄ects on the quota price and total abatement costs
are relatively small. Overall costs are e314 million, only 3.8% higher than in the cost-
e⁄ective outcome with costs of e 305m. In addition, in comparison to the cost-e⁄ective
outcome, more abatement is found to take place in the initial EU Member States when
countries have market power. Perhaps surprisingly, it should be noted that B￿hringer and
Rosendahl (2008) ￿nd that the EU could achieve its emission reduction commitments at a
lower cost without a trading scheme (costs of e 5.3bn) than with the EU ETS based on the
actual Phase 2 NAPs agreed upon (costs of e 8.2bn). This is mainly because abatement
requirements are very tough for the non-trading sectors in Portugal and Spain.
83 The model
Let there be n countries, i = 1;￿￿￿ ;n. Country i has an exogenously given emission ceiling
Ei. Polluters in each country are divided into a trading and a non-trading sector. The
rules according to which polluters (or polluting activities) are divided into the two sectors
are exogenous. Total bene￿ts of emissions ei in the trading sector of country i are ￿i(ei);
with marginal bene￿ts positive (￿0
i(ei) > 0) and decreasing in emissions (￿00
i(ei) ￿ 0).
Total bene￿ts of emissions "i in the non-trading sector of country i are ￿i("i); again with
￿
0
i > 0; ￿
00
i ￿ 0: When there is an international permit trading scheme, the polluters
in the trading sector can trade internationally with each other, but the polluters in the
non-trading sector cannot.
Let us start with the autarky benchmark.3 Each country i has to decide how to divide
its ceiling Ei between the trading and the non-trading sector. It allocates ei ￿ 0 emissions
to the trading sector and the rest "i = Ei￿ei ￿ 0 to the non-trading sector. Each country
i maximizes total bene￿ts:
max ￿i(ei) + ￿i(Ei ￿ ei) (1)
Let ea
i be the emissions allocated to and taking place in the trading sector under
autarky, with ea










We have assumed here that ￿rms that do not trade permits internationally can still
be regulated e¢ ciently such that they all have the same marginal bene￿ts. This may be
because these sectors participate in a domestic trading scheme or they are subject to a
carbon tax.
With international emission trading, country i￿ s trading sector emissions ei can di⁄er
from the amount of emissions ￿ ei allocated to the sector by country i￿ s emission authority.4
Total allowed emissions, ￿ ei for the trading sector plus "i for the non-trading sector, must
3Needless to say, autarky only refers to emission trading. There may very well be international trade
in goods.
4It makes no di⁄erence to our analysis whether the national government auctions or grandfathers the
permits to its ￿rms, or (in the latter case) how it distributes the permits among its ￿rms. This is because
we assume the permit market is perfectly competitive for ￿rms, and because we are only interested in
the welfare of the country as a whole.
9add up to the national ceiling Ei: After each country has set its ￿ ei and distributed the
permits among its trading sector, the polluters in the trading sectors trade the permits
among each other. We assume that each individual polluter is too small to have market
power. Thus each polluter takes the permit price P as given, so that ei is determined by:
￿
0
i(ei) = P (3)








i.e. total emissions in all trading sectors equal the total amount of permits for the trading
sectors. Equations (3) and (4) implicitly de￿ne P and ei as a function of total trading









































Country i now chooses ￿ ei to maximize:
￿i(ei) + ￿i(Ei ￿ ￿ ei) + P(￿ ei ￿ ei) (8)
which is assumed to have a unique maximum. The ￿rst order condition is:
￿￿
0
i(Ei ￿ ￿ ei) + P + P
0(￿ ei ￿ ei) = 0 (9)
4 Buyers and sellers
De￿ne Marginal Revenue MRi for country i as:
MRi(￿ ei; ￿ e￿i) ￿ P(￿ ei + ￿ e￿i) + P
0(￿ ei + ￿ e￿i)[￿ ei ￿ ei] (10)
10We will now see that a country￿ s Marginal Revenue curve is between the international
demand curve and the trading sector￿ s Marginal Bene￿t curve, and that the three curves
intersect only once (if at all).
Lemma 1 For a given vector ￿ e￿i:
1. If there is an e0
i 2 [0;Ei] with
MRi(e
0








MRi(￿ ei; ￿ e￿i)
>
















1. By (3) and (10), if ￿ ei = e0




i; ￿ e￿i) = P(e
0
i + ￿ e￿i)
By (10):
MRi(￿ ei; ￿ e￿i) ￿ P(￿ ei + ￿ e￿i) = P
0(￿ ei + ￿ e￿i)[￿ ei ￿ ei] (12)
Since P 0 < 0 by (5), the LHS of (12) is zero if and only if ￿ ei ￿ei = 0: By (7), ￿ ei ￿ei
is increasing in ￿ ei: Thus e0
i is unique.
2. Since e0
i is unique by Lemma 1.1, then if MRi(￿ ei; ￿ e￿i) > (<)P(￿ ei+￿ e￿i) for one ￿ ei <
(>)e0
i; then it holds for all ￿ ei < (>)e0








i + ￿ e￿i) (13)
then MRi(￿ ei; ￿ e￿i) > (<)P(￿ ei +￿ e￿i) for ￿ ei just below (above) e0
i; and thereby for all
￿ ei < (>)e0














The inequality follows from (7). Thus (13) is satis￿ed.
113. Since e0
i is unique by Lemma 1.1, then if MRi(￿ ei; ￿ e￿i) < (>)￿0
i(￿ ei) for one ￿ ei < (>)e0
i;
then it holds for all ￿ ei < (>)e0










then MRi(￿ ei; ￿ e￿i) < (>)￿0
i(￿ ei) for ￿ ei just below (above) e0
i; and thereby for all
￿ ei < (>)e0





































The inequality holds because multiplying both sides by ￿￿00
i(e0

























We can now determine which countries will be buyers and which will be sellers of
permits:





i + ￿ e￿i)
Then country i will buy (sell) permits when ￿0
i(ea
i) > (<) ~ P a
i : A buyer (seller) country
will allocate less (more) permits to the trading sector than under autarky, and emissions
by the trading sector in a buyer (seller￿ s) country will be higher (lower) than in autarky.
That is: ￿ et
i < ea
i < et
i for a buyer and et
i < ea
i < ￿ et
i for a seller country.


























i) > (<)P a
i will hold if ea
i < (>)e0
i, in which case MRi(ea




i). In addition, we know from (9) know that ￿
0
i(E￿￿ et
i) = MRi(￿ et
i; ￿ e￿i). Therefore it must
12be that ￿ et
i < (>)ea
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i) > (<)P(￿ et
i +￿ et
￿i), and given the ￿rst order condition
￿0
i(et
i) = P(￿ et
i + ￿ et








The intuition behind these results is as follows. Firstly, ￿ et
i < (>)ea
i holds for a buyer
(seller), because at ea
i the marginal revenue of reducing (increasing) the allocation to the
trading sector by one permit is less (more) than the marginal abatement costs associated
with increasing (decreasing) emissions in the non-trading sector. Hence decreasing (in-
creasing) ￿ ei must lead to an increase in welfare. Secondly, et
i > (<)ea
i holds for a buyer
(seller), because at ea
i if country i increases (reduces) its trading sector emisssions, it is
able to buy (sell) more permits, for which the marginal revenue is less (greater) than
the associated marginal bene￿t from emissions in the trading sector. Hence increasing
(decreasing) ei must lead to an increase in welfare.
5 Welfare
Let us consider a country￿ s welfare as a function of which sectors are included in the
trading scheme. It is easily seen that:
1. Every country￿ s welfare is higher with an international trading scheme (regardless of
which sectors are included) than without any trading scheme. This is the standard
economics result that trade improves welfare and is illustrated graphically below.
2. Aggregate welfare is highest when all sectors are included in the trading scheme. In
this case, all sectors in all countries will have equal marginal abatement costs, and
aggregate welfare is maximized. As long as there are non-trading sectors, however,
a country will allocate its emissions between trading and non-trading sectors in a
way that manipulates the permit price in its favour. This will increase this country￿ s
























Figure 1: The switch from autarky to competitive international trade
Let us consider a country￿ s change in welfare from autarky to the international trading
scheme in two steps. First we look at the change from autarky to competitive international
trade, illustrated in Figure 1. Then we consider the change in the international permit
market from competitive to one with market power (Figure 2). Country i has a national
emission ceiling of Ei: It has marginal bene￿ts MBt
i of emissions ei in the trading sector,
measured from left to right in Figure 1. It has marginal bene￿ts MBn
i of emissions
"i in the non-trading sector, measured from right to left. In autarky, the country sets
MBt
i = MBn
i ; so that emissions in the trading sector are ea
i and marginal bene￿ts in
both sectors are P a
i : Total bene￿ts are AFG for the trading sector and DFG for the
non-trading sector.
Now consider a competitive international trading regime, with a permit price P c that
the country takes as given. Country i now has to divide its national emissions Ei between
14Figure 2: The switch from competitive trade to trade with market power
emissions for the non-trading sector "i and permits ￿ ei allocated to the trading sector, the
latter measured from left to right in Figure 1. The country sets MBn
i = P c; so that it
allocates ￿ ec
i permits to the trading sector. This sector will only emit ec
i and sell the rest
of its permits abroad. Total bene￿ts from emissions are now AKH in the trading sector
and DLJ in the non-trading sector. In addition, the trading sector receives the revenue
of HKLJ from selling HJ permits. Total welfare has increased by KLF compared to
autarky.
Figure 2 illustrates the switch from competitive trade to trade with market power.
As before, the international permit price will be P c if the country issues ￿ ec
i permits to
its trading sector, but the permit price is now a decreasing function P(￿ ei) of ￿ ei. The
country will be a net seller (buyer) of permits if it issues less (more) than e0
i permits
to its trading sector. We know from Lemma 1 that marginal revenue MRi lies above
15(below) P(￿ ei) for any ￿ ei < (>)e0
i because allocating more permits to the trading sector
depresses the permit price, which is an extra bene￿t when the country is buying permits,
but an extra cost when it is selling. The MRi curve lies below (above) MBt
i; so that
the country will allocate less (more) permits to the trading sector when it can buy (sell)
them abroad. The country now sets MRi = MBn
i ; reducing its permit allocation to the
trading sectors to ￿ et
i and driving the price up to P t in Figure 2. The trading sector will
now emit et
i: Total bene￿ts from emissions are ASV in the trading sector and DXZ in the
non-trading sector. In addition, the trading sector receives the revenue of V SNZ from
selling V Z permits. The gain in welfare compared to competitive trade is KSNY ￿Y LX:
This is positive, because by de￿nition, allocating ￿ et
i to the trading sector when faced with
the inverse demand function P(￿ ei) maximizes country i￿ s welfare. The loss Y LX is the
e¢ ciency loss from the domestic distortion of letting MBn
i deviate from the permit price.
The gain KSNY is the gain from being able to sell the permits at a higher price.
6 Expanding the trading scheme
6.1 A two-country model
In this section we analyze the welfare e⁄ects of expanding the trading scheme. For sim-
plicity, we assume there are just two countries i, where i = 1;2; and bene￿t functions
are quadratic. We divide the economy into three sectors j, where j = 1;2;3. Sector j of
country i has a bene￿t function ￿ji(eji) given by:






where marginal bene￿ts are:
￿
0
ji(eji) = b0 ￿ bjieji (19)
Thus bji represents the slope of the marginal abatement cost curve in sector j of
country i. We consider two scenarios S; S = A;B. In scenario A, sector 1 is in the
trading scheme while sectors 2 and 3 are outside. In scenario B, sectors 1 and 2 are in
















i ￿ b3i (20)
Aggregate bene￿t functions for the trading and non-trading sectors in country i in
scenario S; S = A;B; are respectively:
￿i(e
S















































In autarky, marginal bene￿ts are equal across sectors in the same country. From (19),
the autarky price in country i with national emission ceiling Ei is given by:
P
a
i = b0 ￿
b1ib2ib3i
b1ib2i + b1ib3i + b2ib3i
Ei (23)
Let us call the buyer country 1. This is the country with the higher autarky price, i.e.
P a
1 > P a
2, which implies from (23) that:




￿1￿2 (￿2E2 ￿ ￿1E1) + ￿1￿2 (￿2E2 ￿ ￿1E1)
￿1￿2￿1￿2
> 0 (25)
In the joint welfare-maximizing outcome, marginal bene￿ts in all sectors would be
equal to each other at P ￿ given by:
P
￿ = b0 ￿
￿1￿2￿1￿2(E1 + E2)
￿1￿2￿1 + ￿1￿2￿2 + ￿1￿1￿2 + ￿2￿1￿2
(26)
With a partial emission trading scheme, the ￿rms that participate in the scheme set
their marginal bene￿ts equal to the permit price:
P





5In the following two equations we suppress the scenario superscript S; because the values of ￿ and
P￿ do not depend on the scenario.
17It follows from (27) for i = 1;2 that:
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i ) = 0 (30)
Substituting (28) and (29) into (30) and suppressing the scenario superscript S for
notational simplicity gives country i￿ s ￿rst order condition with marginal revenues MRi
as de￿ned in Section 4:
MB
n







(￿ ei + ￿ ej)
￿
￿ MRi (31)



























2 + ￿1￿2(￿1￿1 + ￿2￿2 + 2[￿1￿2 + ￿2￿1]) + (￿1 + ￿2)
2￿1￿2 (34)
Substituting (33) into (28), we ￿nd the permit price in the international trading scheme
as:
P = b0 ￿
￿1￿2
￿
[￿1￿2(￿1E1 + ￿2E2) + (￿1 + ￿2)￿1￿2(E1 + E2)] (35)





2￿1￿2 (￿1 ￿ ￿2)
￿(￿1￿2￿1 + ￿1￿2￿2 + ￿1￿1￿2 + ￿2￿1￿2)
(36)





























Figure 3: E⁄ect of the slope of the MBn
i curve
Proposition 2 Comparing the equilibrium international permit price P in (35) to the
joint welfare-maximizing price P ￿ in (26), we ￿nd:
1. When ￿1 = ￿2; P = P ￿;
2. When ￿1 < (>)￿2; P < (>)P ￿; i.e. the country with the lowest ￿i manages to
manipulate the permit price in its favour.
Figure 3 illustrates the e⁄ect of ￿i which is the slope of the MBn
i curve. If country i
took the permit price P c as given, it would issue ￿ ec
i permits to it trading sector. When
￿i is large so that country i￿ s marginal bene￿ts in the non-trading sector are given by the
steep curve; it will reduce its permit allocation to the trading sector to ￿ et
i; driving the
permit price up to P t: It would lose Y LX relative to the competitive outcome because of
the domestic distortion, but gain KSNY from the higher permit price. Now suppose that
19￿i is small, so that country i￿ s marginal bene￿ts in the non-trading sector are given by the
much ￿ atter curve MBn0
i instead. The country would still issue ￿ ec
i permits to the trading
sector if it took the permit price P c as given. However, its loss from reducing permits to
the trading sector to ￿ et
i is now only Y LC: Since the domestic distortion of manipulating
the permit price is much smaller now, the country will go further in driving up the permit
price. In fact, it will reduce permits to the trading sector to ￿ et0
i ; driving the permit price
up to P t0: This will lead to a domestic distortion loss of Y 0LX0 and a gain of KS0N0Y 0
from the higher permit price.
This shows that the ￿ atter a country￿ s marginal bene￿ts in the non-trading sector, the
further it will manipulate the permit price. A ￿ at marginal bene￿t curve means that there
is only a small cost of letting the permit allocation deviate from the point where marginal
bene￿ts equal the permit price. In our two-country model with asymmetric non-trading
sectors, the country with the lower ￿i will succeed in pulling the equilibrium permit price
away from P ￿ in its preferred direction (higher for a seller, lower for a buyer). If the
non-trading sectors are symmetric, the two countries￿e⁄orts to pull the permit price in
opposite directions cancel each other out and the permit price remains at P ￿:
We wish to avoid corner solutions in ￿ ei. Country 1 that buys permits will allocate
less permits to its trading sectors than in autarky, because it can now buy the permits
cheaper from abroad. We want to make sure that ￿ e1 > 0 in (32). Since this condition is
most likely to be violated in Scenario A, with just sector 1 in the international trading
scheme, we ￿nd by substituting (20):
￿












Country 2 that sells permits will allocate more permits to its trading sectors than in
autarky, because it can now sell the permits abroad at a higher price. The country would
never want to allocate more than its national ceiling to the trading sectors, however. This
would mean that its marginal bene￿ts in the non-trading sectors (MBn
2 in (31)) would
exceed b0: However, it is clear from (31) that marginal revenues in the trading sectors
MR2 can never exceed b0:
Finally, we would like to make sure that marginal bene￿ts (and permit prices) in all

























all marginal bene￿ts are positive. From (??) and (32), this implies:
b0 >

























if and only if:
2b11b12b21b22 + 2b11b12b22b31 + b11b21b22b31 + 2b12b21b22b31 > b12b
2
21b31
In order to develop a deeper understanding of the structure of the model, whilst
maintaining a tractable analysis, we will allow the bji to be asymmetric between countries
for one sector j at a time. We are interested in country i￿ s change in welfare ￿Wi when






6.2 Asymmetries in the original trading sector
In this subsection we consider asymmetries in sector 1 only, so that b21 = b22 = b2 and
b31 = b32 = b3 in (18), which implies ￿1 = ￿2 = ￿ by (20) The expression for the welfare
change is then given by (40) in Section 8.1 of the Appendix. We see that the welfare
change is the same for both countries, and always positive.
To understand this result, note that in both scenarios A and B, the non-trading sectors
are symmetric across countries. Then we know from Proposition 2 that in both scenarios
the equilibrium permit price is equal to the permit price P ￿ in the joint-welfare maximiz-
ing scenario. Thus, the permit price does not change when expanding the international
trading scheme. Furthermore, as can be seen from adding up the ￿rst order conditions
(30) for the two countries, the equilibrium permit price is the average of the marginal
bene￿ts in the non-trading sectors in each country. Thus, letting P
j
i denote the mar-
ginal bene￿ts in non-trading sector(s) j in country i, we have P
2;3




1 ￿ P ￿ = P ￿ ￿ P 3
2: Then also P
2;3
1 ￿ P 3




Finally we will see that P 3
1 < P
2;3




selling country 2 is analogous. From (32) and (34) with ￿1 = ￿2 = ￿; we ￿nd:
￿(E1 ￿ ￿ e1) =
￿￿1￿2 (2￿1￿2E1 + ￿2￿E1 + 2￿1￿E1 + ￿1￿E2)
2￿2
1￿2
2 + 3￿1￿2￿(￿1 + ￿2) + (￿1 + ￿2)2￿2
21Substituting this and (20) into (22), we see that P 3
1 < P
2;3
1 if and only if:
(2b2b11 + b3b11 + b2b3)b12E1 + b11b3(b11 + b12)(2E1 + E2)
b11b12(b2 + 2b3) + b2b3(b11 + b12)
>
(b2b3 + 2b2b11 + 2b3b11)b12E1 + b11b2b3(2E1 + E2)
b11b12(b2 + b3) + b2b3(b11 + b12)
This inequality reduces to (24).
Thus P 3
i is closer to P ￿ than is P
2;3
i : Intuitively, both countries have a smaller non-
trading sector in scenario B which makes it more di¢ cult to manipulate the permit price.
For country 1, for instance, raising marginal bene￿ts in the non-trading sector by a certain
amount releases less permits to the trading sector in scenario B. Moreover, issuing a certain
amount of permits to the trading sector leads to a smaller reduction in the permit price
in scenario B, since the trading sector is larger.
Figure 4 illustrates the welfare assessment.6 Country i￿ s emission ceiling is given
by Ei: Emissions in the trading sectors are measured from left to right, starting at O:
Emissions in the non-trading sectors are measured from right to left, starting at Ei:
Country i￿ s marginal bene￿ts in sector(s) j are given by the curve MB
j
i: The countries￿
changes in welfare from the expansion of the trading scheme are best assessed against the
benchmark of the joint welfare-maximizing outcome. In this outcome, marginal bene￿ts
in all sectors would be P ￿ and country 1￿ s emissions in sectors 2 and 3 together would be
N1E1: Instead, they are F1E1 in scenario A. The emission reduction of N1F1 means that
bene￿ts are N1S1K1F1 lower in sectors 2 and 3, however they also save the expenditure
N1S1G1F1of buying N1F1 permits at a price of P ￿: In scenario B, country 1￿ s sector-3
emissions are L1E1; which is J1L1 less than the sector￿ s emissions J1E1 in the welfare
optimum. Country 1￿ s welfare is Z1U1T1 lower than in the welfare optimum: Forgone
sector-3 bene￿ts of J1Z1U1L1 minus J1Z1T1L1 saved on buying permits.
Country 1￿ s welfare gain of including sector 2 into the trading scheme is then S1K1G1￿
Z1U1T1 > 0: The di⁄erence is positive, because G1K1 > T1U1 since P
2;3
1 > P 3
1, and
because S1G1 > Z1T1 since MB
2;3
1 is the horizontal summation of MB2
1 and MB3
1 and
thereby ￿ atter than MB3
1. In the same way it follows that country 2￿ s welfare gain is
6Figures 4 to 6 can be derived graphically, but this is a rather tortuous process. Details are available
from the corresponding author upon request.
22Figure 4: Asymmetries in sector 1 only
K2G2S2 ￿ U2T2Z2 > 0: It is easily seen that K2G2S2 and U2Z2T2 are equal in size to
S1K1G1 and Z1U1T1 respectively; because sectors 2 and 3 are symmetric across the two
countries.
We conclude that both countries gain from the expansion of the international trading
scheme, because the reduction in the size of the non-trading sector reduces the distortion
in this sector. Marginal bene￿ts as well as emissions in the non-trading sector are closer
to the optimum in Scenario B.
236.3 Asymmetries in the additional trading sector
In this scenario, there are asymmetries in sector 2 only, so that b11 = b12 = b1 and
b31 = b32 = b3 in (18). In this case, ￿Wi is given by (41) in Section 8.2 of the Appendix.
The welfare e⁄ects of expanding the trading scheme di⁄er between the two countries and
can even be negative for one country. However, there is always an aggregate welfare gain,
as shown by (44) and (42).
To investigate the possiblity that one country could be made worse o⁄, numerical
simulations are conducted for the case in which b21 is variable. The sign of the welfare
change ￿Wi in (41) is the sign of Vi: First, let us set b1 = b22 = b3 = 1. Then Vi is, for














Three scenarios may arise: (a) if b21 < 1
7; welfare will fall in country 1 but rise in
country 2; (b) if 1
7 < b21 < 8:266; welfare will rise in both countries; (c) if b21 > 8:266;
welfare will rise in country 1 but fall in country 2.
Figure 5 illustrates the case with b1 = b22 = b3 = 1 and b21 = 1
16 < 1
7; so that country
1 loses from the expansion of the trading scheme. From Proposition 2, we know that
in scenario A, the international permit price P A is below the joint welfare-maximizing
permit price P ￿; because the buying country 1 has the ￿ atter MB2;3 curve. In scenario
B, however, the equilibrium permit price equals P ￿, because the non-trading sectors 3 are
symmetric in the two countries.
A country￿ s welfare in scenarios A and B is best assessed as compared to the benchmark
of autarky. Country 1￿ s autarky equilibrium is at K1; with emissions OF1 in sector 1 and
F1E1 in sectors 2 and 3 together.
In scenario A, sector 1 emissions have increased by F1e1 to Oe1: This has raised sector 1
bene￿ts by F1K1We1; but the extra permits had to be bought abroad at a price of P A and
an expense of F1I1We1: The net increase in bene￿ts in sector 1 is then I1K1W: Emissions
in sectors 2 and 3 have increased by L1F1 to L1E1: This has raised bene￿ts in these sectors
by L1Y1K1F1; but if sector 1 had received these L1F1 permits instead, it would not have
had to buy them abroad at price P A and an expenditure of L1H1I1F1 would have been
24Figure 5: Asymmetries in sector 2 only
saved. The net increase in bene￿ts in sectors 2 and 3 is then H1Y1K1I1: Country 1￿ s total
increase in bene￿ts moving from autarky to scenario A is then H1Y1K1W:
In scenario B, if all sectors faced the welfare optimum price of P ￿; country 1 would
have gained S1K1G relative to autarky. However, while the international permit price is
P ￿ for sectors 1 and 2, sector 3 has marginal bene￿ts above P ￿: Its emissions are V1E1
while they would be X1E1 at marginal bene￿ts of P ￿: This reduces sector 3￿ s bene￿ts by
X1Z1U1V1: However, if sector 3 had emissions of X1E1; sectors 1 and 2 would have had
X1V1 permits less. They would then have had to buy these permits abroad at price P ￿,
which would have cost them X1Z1T1V1: Thus, the e¢ ciency loss of sector 3￿ s marginal
bene￿ts deviating from P ￿ is Z1U1T1: Country 1￿ s total increase in bene￿ts moving from
autarky to scenario B is then S1K1G ￿ U1T1Z1:
Country 1￿ s change in welfare when moving from scenario A to B is then S1K1G ￿
25U1T1Z1 ￿ H1Y1K1W = S1Y1N1 ￿ H1N1GW ￿ U1T1Z1; which is clearly negative. Thus,
country 1 loses from the expansion of the trading scheme.
In the same way, country 2￿ s change in welfare when moving from scenario A to B is
GS2K2 ￿ U2T2Z2 ￿ WH2Y2K2 = WGS2Y2H2 ￿ U2T2Z2; which is clearly positive. Thus,
country 2 gains from the expansion of the trading scheme. Moreover, comparing the
welfare changes of both countries, it is clear that there is an overall welfare gain from the
expansion of the trading scheme.
Intuitively, the reason why country 1 loses from the expansion of the trading scheme
is that its extremely ￿ at marginal bene￿t curve for the non-trading sectors gives it a
large advantage in scenario A. We have already seen the e⁄ect of a ￿ at MBn curve in
Figure 3. Note that country 1 will buy permits abroad and therefore wants to decrease
the permit price by allocating more permits to its trading sector and less permits to its
non-trading sector. It can achieve the latter quite painlessly in scenario A, because this
results in just a small e¢ ciency loss due to the ￿ atness of the MB
2;3
1 curve. In scenario A,
country 1 manages to depress the permit price to P A: In scenario B, sector 2 has joined
the international trading scheme. Now country 1 does not have the advantage of a ￿ at
MBn curve anymore and the permit price equals the joint welfare-maximizing price P ￿.
Of course, country 1￿ s large gain in scenario A is at the expense of country 2. That
is why country 2 gains substantially from the expansion of the trading scheme. Indeed,
country 2 gains more than country 1 loses.
Having established that one country can lose from the expansion of the trading scheme
when b1 = b22 = b3 = 1; let us now examine whether this can still occur when we vary
b1 and b3: First, let b3 approach in￿nity. This is equivalent to there being no non-trading
sector in scenario B: The trading scheme is extended to include the whole economy. As
we know, the sign of the welfare change ￿Wi in (41) is the sign of Vi: For b1 = b22 = 1
and b3 ! 1 we ￿nd from (42) that Vi > 0 if and only if Xi > 0 with:
X1 = 13b
2
21 + 6b21 ￿ 3 X2 = ￿7b
2
21 + 14b21 + 9
We ￿nd again that three scenarios may arise; (a) if b21 < 0:302; welfare will fall in
country 1 but rise in country 2; (b) if 0:302 < b21 < 2:512; welfare will rise in both
26countries; (c) if b21 > 2:512; welfare will rise in country 1 but fall in country 2. Compared
to the case with b3 = 1; a welfare decrease for either country occurs for a larger range
of parameter values. Although joint welfare is maximized with all sectors in the trading
scheme (as we argued in the Introduction), it is very well possible that one of the two
countries loses in the move from partial to full international trading.
Finally, consider the case for which b22 = b3 = 1 and b1 becomes arbitrarily large.
This implies that there is no original trading sector: Scenario A amounts to autarky. We
have already seen in Section 5 that a move from autarky to international trade (however
partial) always increases a country￿ s welfare. This ￿nding is supported by the numerical
simulation: As b1 tends towards in￿nity, both countries are made better o⁄ regardless of
the value of b21. Even for very large (but ￿nite) values of b1; country 1 still loses from
the expansion of the trading scheme if b21 is very small. Country 2, however, always
gains for su¢ ciently large values of b1: The expression for ￿W2 with b11 = b12 = b1 and
b22 = b31 = b32 = b3 is given by (46) in Section 8.2 of the Appendix. We see that the














The only non-negative solution for Y2 = 0 is b1=b3 = 1:815: Thus if b1=b3 > 1:815;
welfare cannot fall in country 2 as the trading scheme is expanded.
6.4 Asymmetries in the non-trading sector
If sectors 1 and 2 are symmetric (b11 = b12 = b1 and b21 = b22 = b2 in (18); and thus
￿1 = ￿2 = ￿ by (20)); then ￿Wi is given by (47) in Section 8.3 of the Appendix. We see
that both countries gain from an expansion of the trading scheme, but the country i with
the smallest b3i gains the least.
The reason for the latter result is that the country with the smallest b3i experiences an
adverse price change when the trading scheme is expanded. This can be shown as follows.
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1b2(b31 + b32) + 3b1b2
2(b31 + b32) + 4(b1 + b2)2b31b32
We see that while the numerators are the same, the denominator is larger for ￿B: Thus
￿B is smaller than ￿A in absolute terms and P B is closer to P ￿ than is P A: Considering
the case where b31 < b32; we know from Proposition 2 that buyer country 1 can manipulate
the international permit price to its advantage in both scenarios, reducing it below P ￿:
However, its power to manipulate the permit price diminishes with the expansion of the
international trading scheme: P A < P B < P ￿: Intuitively, the smaller the non-trading
sector, the more its marginal bene￿ts rise when country 1 moves permits toward the
trading sector. In addition, the larger the trading sector, the less the permit declines rises
when country 1 issues more permits to its trading sectors.
Figure 6 illustrates the welfare e⁄ects for b1 = b2 = b32 = 1 and b31 = 1
16: We are
particularly interested in country 1, because we know that this country will have the
smallest welfare gain as b31 < b32: We see that the expansion of the trading scheme causes
the permit price to rise from P A to P B: This is to the advantage of the seller country 2,
but to the disadvantage of the buyer country 1.
In autarky, country 1 sets the marginal bene￿ts for all its sectors equal to P a
1: Emissions
are OF1 in sector 1, F1X1 in sector 2 and X1E1 in sector 3.7 In scenario A, sector-1
emissions have increased from OF1 to Oe1: Analogous to our discussion of the welfare
e⁄ects in subsection 6.3, this implies a net gain of I1K1W in sector 1. Sectors 2 and
3 have marginal bene￿ts of P
2;3
1 ; which means their emissions have increased by L1F1;
yielding a net welfare gain of H1Y1K1I1: Country 1￿ s welfare gain when moving from
autarky to scenario A is then H1Y1K1W: Moving from autarky to scenario B, emissions in
sectors 1 and 2 have increased from OX1 to OJ; resulting in a net gain of U1T1G: Sector
7To improve legibility, Figure 6 has been stretched horizontally, so that E1 no longer appears in it.
28Figure 6: Asymmetries in sector 3 only
3￿ s marginal bene￿ts are now P 3
1; which means its emissions have increased by V1X1;
giving a welfare gain of N1Z1T1U1: Country 1￿ s welfare gain when moving from autarky
to scenario B is then N1Z1T1G:
Comparing country 1￿ s welfare in scenarios A and B, we see that the changes in sector
3 are minuscule, because its marginal bene￿ts decrease only slightly from P
2;3
1 to P 3
1:
Therefore we will concentrate on sectors 1 and 2, setting marginal bene￿ts in the non-
trading sectors in both scenarios at P 3
1: When moving from scenario A to B, country 1 then
gains the light-shaded area, but loses the dark-shaded area. The former area represents
sector 2￿ s gain from a decrease of its marginal bene￿ts from P
2;3
1 ￿ P 3
1 to P B: The latter
area represents sector 1￿ s loss from a rise in the international permit price from P A to
P B: It is clear that the welfare gain exceeds the welfare loss: Country 1 gains from the
29expansion of the international trading scheme.
Finally, country 2￿ s welfare gain when moving from scenario A to B can be determined
in a similar way as GI2Z2T2￿WH2Y2K2; which is clearly positive and larger than country
1￿ s gain.
7 Conclusion
We have constructed a model of a partial international emission trading scheme, such as
the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), in which countries decide non-cooperatively
how to allocate their nationally allowed emissions between their trading and their non-
trading sectors. Countries that sell permits will want to reduce their permit allocation to
the trading sector in a bid to drive up the permit price. Buying countries want to do the
opposite.
It is easily seen that countries always gain when moving from autarky to any partial
international emission trading scheme, and that aggregate welfare is maximized when all
polluting sectors are included in the scheme. However, this does not mean that every
country will always gain from an expansion of the scheme. Studying the welfare e⁄ects of
an expansion of the trading scheme is policy-relevant, as the European Commission plans
to expand the EU ETS in 2013.
We have simulated the e⁄ects of expanding the trading scheme in a two-country model.
If the additional trading sectors and the non-trading sectors are symmetric between coun-
tries, the welfare change is the same in both countries and is always positive. If the
original trading sectors and the non-trading sectors are symmetric, one country might
lose, but there is an aggregate welfare gain. Moreover, the asymmetries in the additional
trading sector have to be quite pronounced for one country to lose from the expansion. If
the original and the additional trading sectors are symmetric, both countries always gain.
An obvious extension to the analysis would be to run simulations of the model in a
computable general equilibrium modelling framework. This would allow for the quanti￿-
cation of the theoretical assertions regarding which countries will be permit buyers and
which will be permit sellers. The EU ETS has now completed its ￿rst phase of operation,
running from 2005-2007, and thus such data are now available for this period. However,
30the dynamics of the EU ETS will be completely di⁄erent in the second Phase since it runs
from 2008-2012 and therefore coincides with the Kyoto commitment period. Thus coun-
tries now face a national ceiling as assumed by this analysis. Moreover, CGE modelling
would allow for an assessment of the welfare e⁄ects of expanding the EU ETS.
In order to keep our analysis manageable, we have assumed that several parameters
were exogenously ￿xed. These include the national emission ceilings and the identity of the
trading sectors. We could model both of these as the product of negotiations between the
countries involved, before they decide non-cooperatively how to allocate their emissions
between trading and non-trading sectors.
Most importantly, we have assumed that countries can freely choose how to allocate
their emissions, whereas the National Allocation Plans for the EU ETS are subject to the
Commission￿ s approval. Any future international emission trading scheme is also likely to
constrain the participating countries￿allocations in order to maintain the integrity of the
system. For the EU ETS, the Commission wants to ensure that Member States do not
overallocate emissions to their trading sectors, for two main reasons. The ￿rst is that it
would distort competition in the product market. The second is that it will make it more
di¢ cult for Member States to meet their Kyoto or burden sharing target. If a country
were really committed to its Kyoto target, then it would already take this e⁄ect into
account itself. However, the Commission may be concerned that Member States do not
take their Kyoto target seriously enough. This consideration is di¢ cult to incorporate in
our current model.
We could model one aspect of the Commission￿ s intervention by capping each country￿ s
trading sector allocation to its autarky allocation. This would constrain the sellers, but
not the buyers in their allocation. However, the buyers will lose because the restriction
will drive up the permit price. The sellers bene￿t from the higher permit price, but they
cannot take full advantage of it because their allocation is restricted. Aggregate welfare
will rise if the permit price rises toward the aggregate welfare-maximizing level.
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338 Appendix: Welfare change from expanding the trad-
ing scheme
8.1 Asymmetries in the original trading sector
When b21 = b22 = b2 and b31 = b32 = b3, then ￿Wi; i = 1;2; in (38) is given by:


























12 (b11 + b12)b2b3(b2 + b3)(5b2 + 8b3)











8.2 Asymmetries in the additional trading sector


















































































































































































































22 + 4(b1 + b3)



























































3 (3b1 + 4b3)b21b22 (b21 + b22) (43)
34The aggregate welfare change is, from (41) to (43):
￿Wi + ￿Wj =
￿2V
d2 (44)



































































































































































































































8.3 Asymmetries in the non-trading sector
When b11 = b12 = b1 and b21 = b22 = b2; then ￿Wi; i = 1;2; in (38) is given by:
￿Wi =
￿2 (4b1b2b3iV + Z)
2b2d2 (47)

































2(b1 + b2)(b31 + b32)
+4b1b2(b1 + b2)































2(b1 + b2)(2b1 + 3b2)(b31 + b32)
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